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Executive Summary 
 The Case Study portion of the National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation 
Planning has been created through extensive research into the existing planning efforts and 
publicly available plans, which address carless and special needs evacuations within five major 
American cities: Chicago, Miami, New Orleans, New York and San Francisco. The Internet 
has been the primary tool utilized to acquire copies of existing plans, with the exception of the 
City of New Orleans, which makes its City Assisted Evacuation Plan available to the public 
only in hard copy.  In many cases, plans were not available to the public, particularly city or 
event specific emergency plans such as Miami-Dade County’s plan for the evacuation of the 
area near Turkey Point Nuclear Facility or the City of New York’s Coastal Storm Plan.  
Generally, plans on the state level were all available, with the exception of Illinois.  The state 
emergency management plans almost all followed the National Response Framework.  
Consequently, special attention was paid to areas were the state’s plan went above and beyond 
this framework with regards to carless and special needs populations.  
 In the cases where plans were not readily available via the Internet, the information was 
solicited via telephone.  A few interviews offered anecdotal guidance for the case studies, but 
most information requests were not well received, particularly when requesting information 
about plans that focus on terrorism preparedness because such plans are typically confidential 
for security reasons.  Given the lack of information readily available, extensive research was 
required to review newspaper articles, meeting minutes and any document that may have made 
mention of issues related to carless and special needs evacuations in each of the case study 
cities.
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 The National Study of Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning has 
constructed an essential outline for carless and special needs evacuation planning.  
This outline is built from planning efforts in each of the five case study cities.  Each 
city had its strengths and weaknesses.  In this study, we have combined the strengths 
from every city involved to build the criteria used to evaluate their planning efforts.  
In this sense, we have based our evaluations upon real planning efforts that can and 
are being done around the United States. 
Introduction: 
 Each of the five case study cities has tailored its planning efforts according to 
perceived risk, often reinforced by the risk assessment and mitigation portions of the 
plans at the state level.  In Chicago, planning efforts have been focused upon 
terrorism and radiological emergencies.  Consequently, their plans are confidential.  
However, a strength seen in the Chicago planning efforts was their use of simulations 
and exercises, although the extent to which carless and special needs persons1
 In Miami and New Orleans, the evacuation planning focus is overwhelmingly 
upon hurricanes.  These plans are made public.  They involve coordinated public 
transit and paratransit efforts to evacuate carless and special needs people effectively.  
Miami has much more experience in this area than New Orleans.  In New Orleans, the 
 are 
considered in these simulations is unclear.   
 New York has planning efforts focused on two primary areas: terrorism and 
coastal storms.  These plans are kept confidential.  The public is made aware of the 
portion of the plans that pertain to them, particularly the location of the nearest 
evacuee reception center.  The strength in New York has been public awareness.  The 
public education efforts made by the Office of Emergency Management cover a wide 
variety of circumstances, and are offered in the widest variety of languages of any of 
the case study cities. 
                                                 
1 The definition “special needs” used herein has been adopted in the National Response Framework 
and developed by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. 
Special needs populations are “populations whose members may have additional needs before, during, 
and after an incident in functional areas, including but not limited to:  maintaining independence, 
communication, transportation, supervision, and medical care… those who have disabilities… 
elderly… children… limited English proficiency… or…  transportation disadvantaged.” 
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plan existed before Hurricane Katrina in 2005, but it was not successfully executed 
until Hurricane Gustav in 2008.  The strengths in Miami and New Orleans are 
experience and management of logistics, particularly between organizations, agencies 
and regions. 
 In San Francisco, the planning focus is primarily based upon earthquakes.  The 
nature of earthquakes does not facilitate evacuations, nor does it make city-wide 
evacuations necessary.  However, San Francisco brings an enormous strength to these 
case studies: community involvement.  San Francisco has gone beyond the 
development of Community Emergency Response Teams or volunteer emergency 
responders.  The City of San Francisco has also accounted for community-based 
resources in its planning efforts, through a concept called the ‘community-hub’.  
 The outline of each of these case studies has been built from the strengths of 
all the case study cities combined.  Therefore, some of these case studies may appear 
rather weak under certain topic headings and strong under others.  Regardless of 
content, each city has been evaluated upon these same criteria and it is important that 
they be listed as topic headings in each case. 
 It is important to also understand the framework or guidance under which 
many of these plans have been created.  This guidance comes from the federal level in 
the form of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), developed and 
administered by the Secretary of Homeland Security since 2003.  NIMS is the 
nation’s authoritative guidance for incident management, standardizing how incident 
response is managed in order to increase collaboration, efficiency and effectiveness.  
It essentially establishes how incident command structures are organized.  
Furthermore, state and local organizations receiving Federal preparedness monies 
were required adopt NIMS as a contingency.    
 The federal government uses the incident command structure under NIMS or 
the National Response Framework, to assign emergency support functions (ESFs) to 
each of its major agencies.  For example, one agency, Housing and Urban 
Development, has the primary role in ESF 14: Long-Term Community Recovery 
(FEMA 2008).  The ESFs are detailed in the following table. 
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Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities of Emergency Support Functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: FEMA 2008 
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 The ESF structure is very evident in emergency planning at the state and local 
level.  States organize their own agencies according to ESFs and become part of the 
inherent command structure.  The guidance of NIMS and ESFs are carried down from 
the federal level to the level of local implementation.   Therefore, in researching 
planning efforts that address carless and special needs evacuation, important 
consideration is given to the guidance for creation of many plans, i.e. NIMS.    
 The ESFs that most closely address carless and special needs evacuation are 
ESF1, Transportation, ESF 6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and 
Human Services, ESF 8, Public Health and Medical Services, and typically, ESF 9, 
Search and Rescue.  Of particular interest to this research is the extent to which these 
ESFs address carless and special needs evacuations.    
 State and local agencies are wise to expand upon the roles defined by federal 
ESFs, particularly concerning carless and special needs evacuation.  Thus, creativity 
and extra effort in planning for such evacuations was given special consideration in 
this research.  Herein are presented five case studies of cities who have tailored their 
planning efforts according to local hazard-specific risks and the national incident 
planning guidance.  The results are five unique cases, each with strengths; each with 
weakness; each with varying levels of public accessibility to plans addressing carless 
and special needs evacuations, and therefore varying research depth among the case 
studies.    
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 Carless and special needs planning efforts in Chicago were difficult to assess 
given the confidentiality of the evacuation plans held by the Illinois Emergency 
Management Agency and the Chicago Office of Emergency Management & 
Communications.  It was fair to assume that the primary focus of Chicago’s incident 
management planning would be terrorism, given the strict confidentiality.  Chicago 
has evacuation plans that involve contraflow traffic
Case Study: Chicago 
2, but the development of these 
plans to concern carless and special needs planning is either confidential or none-
existent, as is the case for any form of special needs registry3
                                                 
2 Contraflow traffic is the utilization of both the inbound and outbound lanes of a highway or interstate 
as one-way evacuation routes.  This can create additional outbound capacity with the goal of 
decreasing evacuation clearance time. 
3 A special needs registry or disaster registry is a database of persons who have voluntarily registered 
themselves for physical assistance during an emergency.  The database is maintained by a local 
emergency management entity or a department of health.  Often the phone number associated with the 
registry is 311, and in many cases, can be called up until the last minute of a planned evacuation.   
 in Chicago.  Given this 
confidentiality, insight into Chicago’s evacuation planning was drawn mostly from 
their incident-training simulations.  Additionally, buildings over eighty feet tall and 
nursing homes are required to develop evacuation plans, but they are limited to 
merely evacuating the building.   
 A number of federal, state and local agencies have collaborated in the creation 
of multiple plans that would address a variety of emergency scenarios within the 
Chicago region.  All of these plans are held in confidence, due to the overriding focus 
of terrorism and radiological emergency response.  This confidentiality has severely 
limited the ability to assess the level of planning which has addressed carless and 
special needs evacuations.   
 At the state level, the Illinois Emergency Management Agency has dedicated 
much of its efforts in planning for evacuations related to radiological emergencies.  
These confidential plans call for the evacuation of a 10-mile radius surrounding each 
facility, the emergency planning zone.  These plans include measures for ‘immobile 
populations’ (IEMA 2005).  The extent and functionality of those measures is also 
confidential. 
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 At the city level, the Chicago Office of Emergency Management & 
Communications (OEMC) has an evacuation plan, which brings together elements of 
Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) plans and transit agencies’ plans.  For 
example, Chicago’s principal transit agencies, Chicago Transit Authority, Metra and 
Pace, each have evacuation procedures, as do O’Hare and Midway Airports (CMAP 
2007).  Additionally, IDOT has numerous state level plans, including the 
Catastrophic Earthquake Preparedness Plan for the New Madrid Earthquake Zone of 
2006 “that would aid in the response and evacuation of affected areas” (IDOT 2008).   
 
State Level Plans: Illinois State 
 The Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) has emergency plans 
that are held in confidence due to their focus on radiological and/or terrorist incidents.  
However, the state plan would logically follow the National Incident Response 
Framework.  Therefore, state and local agencies are designated with emergency 
support functions under the Illinois State Emergency Plan.  One emergency support 
function that specifically relates to carless and particularly special needs evacuation 
planning is the responsibility of the Illinois Department of Public Health.    
 The Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) has the emergency support 
function of coordinating the dispersal of medication and supplies to hospitals and 
health departments in the case of an emergency.  Medications would come from the 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).  The Illinois SNS plan was highly rated, 
compared to other SNS plans, by the Center for Disease Control.  This rating is owed 
to the IDPH collaboration with multiple agencies, which include the Illinois 
Emergency Management Agency’s (IEMA) distribution support; the Illinois State 
Police’s security support; the Illinois National Guard’s warehousing support; the 
Illinois Department of Transportation’s support and the Illinois Department of 
Corrections’ support.  
 The Strategic National Stockpile Plan was simulated in various drills, 
including two that had an evacuation component: FLUEX 2006 and the Prairie 
Thunder Exercise.      
 FLUEX 2006 occurred in May of 2006.  It was a simulation of agency 
response to a widespread health crisis coinciding with terrorist attacks.  “More than 50 
representatives from state and federal agencies and the American Red Cross reported 
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to the State Incident Response Center (SIRC) within the State Emergency Operations 
Center (SEOC) in Springfield to participate in the exercise” (IDPH 2007).  
 The Prairie Thunder Exercise was a five-day simulation of large-scale 
evacuations and sheltering in response to a theoretical terrorist attack.  The variety of 
federal, state and local agencies involved conducted three scenarios “that included 
intelligence gathering and response to simulated terrorist attacks, distribution of 
materials from the Strategic National Stockpile, victim search and rescue efforts and 
establishment of a field hospital for treating ‘victims” (IDPH 2007).   
 TOPOFF 2 was a national terrorism simulation that involved the release of the 
Pneumonic Plague in Chicago.  The simulation involved the Strategic National 
Stockpile as well (DHS 2003).  It appears that FLUEX 2006, Prairie Thunder, and 
TOPOFF 2 all involved mass casualties and victim rescues.  It is unclear how many 
of those rescues involved victims with special needs beyond the infection of the 
simulated biological agents. 
 The Illinois Department of Public Health requires that nursing or assisted 
living homes have an evacuation plan.  The extent to which these plans have been 
developed beyond the basic requirements varies from facility to facility.  At the most 
basic level, these plans simply call for residents to be removed from the facility under 
defined circumstances such as fire or power outage.  This inadequate standard means 
that nursing home residents could be left standing outside if a hazard does occur and 
the facility become uninhabitable.  They do not mandate that memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs) be obtained from transportation providers for the evacuation 
of residents to a sister facility.  Nor do they mandate that sister facility relationships 
be established.       
 The logistics of an evacuation have been planned regarding those persons with 
vehicles.  The Illinois Terrorism Task Force was delegated planning responsibilities 
by the Illinois State Police who hold emergency management responsibilities.  The 
Task Force’s Transportation Committee, Evacuation Sub-Group launched the Chicago 
Area Transportation Study, which was completed for the Chicago area.  This study 
estimated that around 180,000 vehicles could flow out of the central business district 
in just three hours.  Additionally, the study resulted in the inclusion of a contraflow or 
lane reversal for the expressway system.  The City of Chicago and the Illinois 
Department of Transportation would close 256 ramps and conduct inspections from 
the air before allowing reversed traffic flow to begin.  The study also delineated 
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alternative evacuation routes, which, along with contraflow, can be found in the 
Travel Demand Management Annex to the Chicago Evacuation Plan (CMAP 2007).   
These planning decisions were made based upon a computer traffic modeling 
software, TRANSIMS, which simulated the movements of a synthetic population, 
individual by individual (TRACC 2008).  Unfortunately, it appears that one 
consideration was outside the realm of the analysis: the potential for transit and 
paratransit4
Metropolitan Planning Organization Plans: CMAP 
 vehicles to move about city collecting carless and special needs evacuees. 
 As of February 2007, the Illinois Terrorism Task Force had also strengthened 
the city’s infrastructure in preparation of a mass evacuation.  They have traffic lights 
with uninterruptible power supply, gates on expressway ramps for contraflow, and 
even “Changeable Message Boards” which can deliver messages to drivers traveling 
in contraflow lanes (CMAP 2007).   
 
 The Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP) has been involved in 
the technological aspect of evacuation traffic planning, particularly contraflow 
management and infrastructure.  However, their role with respect to carless and 
special needs evacuation planning appears to be limited. 
 
City / County Level Plans: Chicago 
 The City of Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications 
(OEMC) does not make public its emergency planning efforts.  Therefore, research 
cannot address the extent to which evacuation planning includes consideration for 
carless and special needs populations.  The Chicago focus group notes that snow 
routes could potentially be used as evacuation routes.  Furthermore, contraflow in the 
state’s plan would logically include a local counterpart.  However, the details are not 
publically available.   
                                                 
4 “Paratransit is the family of transportation services which falls between the single occupant 
automobile and fixed route transit. Examples of paratransit include taxis, carpools, vanpools, 
minibuses, jitneys, demand responsive bus services, and specialized bus services for the mobility 
impaired or transportation disadvantaged.” http://www.fema.gov/oer/reference/glossary.shtm 
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 The City of Chicago does not maintain a disaster registry5
 The Chicago High Rise Evacuation Ordinance “requires all residential and 
commercial buildings over 80 feet (ft.) in height to have an evacuation plan.” 
Buildings are classified in to four height categories; those in the first two categories 
“MUST file evacuation plans with the (OEMC).” (City of Chicago 2008) Those in the 
third and forth categories may voluntarily file evacuation plans with the Office of 
Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC).  These plans do consider 
special needs by including a list of those who have requested assistance evacuating 
the building and the type of assistance they require.  (City of Chicago, 2008)  It is 
unclear what types of resources (evacuation chairs
.  However, the 
Chicago Transportation Authority does offer paratransit services to those persons with 
mobility restrictions who meet the application requirements.  The existence of plans to 
utilize the paratransit service and its client database in the event of an evacuation are 
either confidential or nonexistent.  
6
The City of Chicago has several public warning systems.  There are 112 
traditional sirens throughout the City, which activate for a variety of emergencies 
including terrorist attacks.  The City operates a 911 Callback System, which calls out 
and gives voice recorded emergency messages.  The phone numbers are from the 911 
database, which is geographically referenced.  Therefore, emergency notification calls 
can be made to geographic areas as necessary.  Chicago also offers the Emergency 
Alert System, which provides emergency notification via radio and television by 
collaborating with area broadcast and cable operators (OEMC 2008). The City’s 
Emergency Information Telephone Bank (312-745-INFO or 877-745-INFO) can be 
activated by the OEMC to offer information pertaining to the emergency, “such as 
closures, evacuation areas, access points, and … financial or family assistance 
available to victims.”  The purpose of the information line is to reduce call volume to 
, paratransit, special needs 
shelters) have been dedicated to these calls for assistance from special needs persons. 
                                                 
5 A ‘disaster registry’ is a list of disabled persons or elderly with mobility needs who have registered 
for evacuation assistance from the City or other organization.  
6 Evacuation chairs are essentially emergency-use wheelchairs specifically designed for traveling 
down stairs by sliding over the top of them with the help of an assistant.  The evacuation chairs are 
also designed for use in tight stairwells of tall buildings. Some models use tank-like rubber tracks that 
allow the assistant to better control speed.  
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911 or 311 operators so they may handle more urgent emergency calls.  Additionally, 
the information line operators may provide the name of the hospital or other location 
where victims have been taken, but not information about any one specific victim. 
(OEMC, 2008)   
 
The Community Level: Chicago 
 Given the confidentiality of the City’s emergency planning efforts, the 
involvement of the community could suffer as a consequence.  However, the City of 
Chicago has programs which bring community volunteers into the role of emergency 
responders, such as the Chicago Citizen Corps, Community Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) training and volunteer program.  The volunteers that wish to participate 
in the program receive 20 hours of training to assist in disaster response situations.  
The CERT teams are present in all the case study cities in some form or another.    
 It is worth mentioning that the American Red Cross offers communication 
services to evacuees within its shelters, namely the ‘Safe and Well’ registry.  Anyone 
can register themselves on the American Red Cross website or by calling 1-800-RED 
CROSS, and leave canned messages for family and friends, such as “currently at 
shelter,” “currently at hotel,” “I am currently/remaining at home,” etc.  Family and 
friends can then access these messages via telephone or Internet at 
http://disastersafe.redcross.org.  
  At the city level, the CTA, Chicago Fire Department and Emergency Medical 
Services conducted an evacuation drill in the Blue Line subway while it was closed 
for repairs between August 24th and September 7th
 In September of 2006, the OEMC conducted an evacuation simulation of 
several buildings in downtown Chicago following an explosion scenario.  
Participation among the public was voluntary.  Participants were allowed to use 
elevators during the drill rather than staircases, thus not testing a very crucial 
component of building evacuations.  Once on the cleared streets, they were instructed 
to walk several blocks away from the ‘scene’ (AP 2006).  Approximately 4,000 
 of 2007.  This was a unique and 
very successful coordination of events.  The open access for multiple days to the 
subway for an emergency drill was an innovative decision (CTA 2007).  The 
simulation was a significant improvement over the previous year’s emergency 
simulation in Chicago. 
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employees from the financial district participated in the drill, which took 45 minutes 
(Hassler 2006).  The simulation was carried out under optimal conditions: the weather 
was good, elevators were functioning, and nothing was actually, or hypothetically, 
wrong.  It appeared to be more similar to an organized fundraising walk, than to an 
actual emergency. The simulation only taught planners “a few simple things such as 
having comfortable shoes available for an emergency” (CMAP 2007).  
 
Recommendations: Chicago 
 It has become evident in these case studies that plan disclosure and risk 
assessment are inter-twined.  If the perceived risk is terrorism, then plans are held in 
confidentiality and rightfully so.  However, considering that public outreach would 
greatly reduce panic and confusion during an evacuation from a natural hazard in 
particular, it may be a valid argument that certain plans be made available publically.  
New York City is discussed later in these pages, particularly regarding the wide 
variety of risks they face, and their ability to involve the public in activities that 
address carless and special needs evacuation planning, and address general disaster 
preparation.  It is a view shared by New York State representative Richard Brodsky, 
whose congressional report recommends plan disclosure legislation.  Furthermore, 
New Orleans and Miami have their primary focus on natural hazards, resulting in 
plans that specifically address carless and special needs evacuations, which are 
anticipated and very open to the public.          
 These case studies also revealed a simple, yet important tool for special needs 
evacuation planning: state review of nursing home evacuation plans.  The weakest 
state standards for such evacuation plans are drawn up from antiquated templates.  
Such plans would leave a group of evacuees standing outside a burning building, 
successfully evacuated up to this point, but with no destination planned.  The 
strongest state standards result in plans that have memorandums of understanding 
with transportation providers and with receiving facilities.  Some go further still, 
monitoring the number of commitments that one provider can make, to avoid over-
booking in the case of widespread hazards. 
 In brief, this study recommends that the OEMC repeat the event simulation 
involving the downtown building evacuation done in 2006.  However, the rules 
should be slightly different.  First, public participation should be encouraged much 
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more.  Second, the elevators should be off-limits.  Third, the area should include 
facilities that have special needs people.  This would give the OEMC a chance to 
evaluate its response to the dynamics of a more realistic evacuation scenario.   
  
Introduction 
Case Study: Miami 
 Miami-Dade County has the most experience with actual evacuations of all the 
case study cities.  The state and local level planning is done in a transparent manner.  
The focus clearly is hurricane risk.  Miami has a strong record of assisting evacuations 
in past hurricanes. 
 At the state level, the Florida Division of Emergency Management has 
prepared and implemented the statewide Comprehensive Emergency Management 
Plan of 2004 (CEMP) as mandated by the State Emergency Management Act.  The 
CEMP creates “a framework for an effective system of comprehensive emergency 
management” (CEMP 2004) which establishes the mechanisms, policies and chain-of-
command in order to facilitate mitigation, preparation, response and recovery.   
 The CEMP also includes hazard specific annexes:  Radiological Emergency 
Management Plan, Terrorism Incident Response Plan, SERT Response Guidelines for 
Wildfire Operations, and Emergency Repatriation Plan.  The Radiological Emergency 
Management Plan contains confidential annexes for each nuclear facility, which 
outline evacuations with measures for residents, transients, and for those with 
mobility impairments (CEMP 2004). 
 The State Management Act delegates certain responsibilities to counties.  
These responsibilities include the development of county-level comprehensive 
emergency management programs and intra-county mutual aid agreements.  
Consequently, the Miami-Dade County Department of Emergency Management and 
Homeland Security (DEM&HS) has developed the Miami-Dade Comprehensive 
Emergency Management Plan (also called CEMP, but not to be confused with the 
state level or even the facility level plans that share the same name).  Miami-Dade’s 
plan has been implemented successfully in evacuations due to several past hurricanes.  
The plan includes carless and special needs evacuation assistance with a disaster 
registry, paratransit, open-public bus pick-up location, public and special needs 
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shelters, multilingual public information, and much more.  The primary agency 
carrying out the carless and special needs assisted evacuations is Miami-Dade Transit, 
guided by the MDT Hurricane Manual of 2006.   
 
State Level Plans: Florida 
 The Florida Division of Emergency Management has developed the 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan CEMP in following with the National 
Response Framework.  The CEMP has sections addressing risk assessment, incident 
command structure, and emergency support functions. 
 The risk assessment section of the CEMP considers all hazards; but tropical 
cyclones are the only “hazard category” listed as potentially “catastrophic”, given the 
history of hurricanes in the State of Florida.  The CEMP lists specific “consequences” 
for each potential hazard.  Those hazards, which are considered to have the potential 
consequence of evacuation, include tropical cyclones, severe weather events, 
environmental hazards (such as flooding, wildfires, etc), terrorism, and technological 
events (such as nuclear power plant accidents) (CEMP 2004). 
  Preparation for hurricanes and the population’s vulnerability is the principal 
focus in Florida.  There have been more than 150 hurricanes and 260 tropical storms, 
since the National Weather Service began keeping records in 1884.  In Florida, 6.13 
million people live in storm surge zones (Hurricane Task Force 2005).  
 The vulnerability of the population of Florida is also expressed in the CEMP.  
Over eighteen percent of the population is 65 or older.  There are three commonly 
spoken languages in Florida: English, Spanish and French Creole.  There are 746 
nursing homes in Florida and over 333,000 people are considered “frail elderly”.  
Florida has over 9,500 hazardous materials facilities and three nuclear power plants.  
Turkey Point facility’s ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone encompasses much of 
Miami-Dade County’s Homestead community, which includes 145,171 people 
(CEMP 2004).    
 The State Emergency Management Act designates the State Emergency 
Response Team (SERT), which is composed of emergency coordination officers.  
These officers each represent one of the various state agencies, which have emergency 
support functions (ESFs) under the CEMP.  The ESFs are outlined according to the 
federally established guidelines of the National Response Framework (see table 2). 
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Table 2: Emergency Support Functions of State Agencies under Florida CEMP 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CEMP 2004 
 
 The Emergency Support Function 1, Transportation is responsible for 
evacuation as well as multi-modal transportation of evacuees, personnel, equipment, 
and materials and supplies.  ESF 1 considers automobile, rail, air and water modes of 
transportation.   
 ESF 6, Mass Care works in coordination with ESF 8, Health and Medical, to 
meet the needs of evacuees in special needs shelters, and in coordination with ESF 15, 
Volunteers and Donations, during an evacuation.  The Department of Business and 
Professional Regulation is the primary agency responsible for ESF 6, however they 
are supported by the American Red Cross, Department of Agriculture and Consumer 
Services, Department of Education, Department of Elder Affairs, Department of 
Military Affairs, the Salvation Army, the Florida Voluntary Organization Active in 
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Disaster, Department of Children and Families, and the Agency of Workforce 
Innovation.   
 The ESF 8, Health and Medical Services coordinates the “public health 
response, triage, treatment and transportation of victims of disaster; assistance in the 
evacuation of victims out of the disaster area after the event; immediate support to 
hospitals and nursing homes…”  The primary agency responsible for this response 
function is the Department of Health. 
 The ESF 15, Volunteers and Donations, designates the responsibilities of 
eighteen separate volunteer organizations. 
 The Florida Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency 
Management has been studying evacuation issues since the 1980s.  They have defined 
storm surge areas, potential evacuee counts, routes, clearance times, and destinations.  
They also worked with the development of the Regional Evacuation Procedure 
(REVAC).  During Hurricane Floyd, the areas recommended for evacuation would 
have resulted in 1.3 million evacuees.  However, more than 2 million people 
evacuated which heavily stressed available resources.  The evacuations were 
completed successfully, despite frustrations with very heavy traffic on the major 
evacuation routes.   The additional evacuees came from areas which were not within 
threatened areas.  They choose to evacuate regardless of directives, therefore 
increasing the number of evacuees; a phenomena called the ashadow evacuation 
(Hurricane Task Force 2005).      
 The ‘Preparedness’ portion of the CEMP’s ‘Method of Operation’ deals with 
evacuation procedures.  REVAC integrates the operations of local emergency 
management, law enforcement, sheltering, public information and neighboring states.    
The REVAC designates the Governor as the director of major evacuations.  It also 
designates a State Coordinating Officer with the power to activate county emergency 
operations centers and shelters.  The REVAC also calls for contraflow or ‘Reverse 
Laning’ to optimize traffic flow out of the evacuation zones. 
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Metropolitan Planning Organization Plans: Miami-Dade MPO 
 The Miami Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) began in 1977 to 
guide interlocal agreements between government agencies; thus allowing them to act 
jointly.  Furthermore, the MPO develops transportation and evacuation plans for the 
metropolitan area.  The MPO’s evacuation planning draws heavily from existing 
plans, namely the state level and city/county level plans.  After all, the authority on 
county emergency evacuation planning would be the Miami-Dade Department of 
Emergency Management and Homeland Security, and the agency executing the 
evacuation is Miami-Dade Transit.  Both of these agencies and their plans, will be 
discussed in the following section: City/County Level Plans. 
 The MPO’s governing board is appointed by the Florida Governor and 
connected to Miami-Dade County.  The board is advised by several committees: 
Citizens Transportation Advisory Committee, the Bicycle Pedestrian Advisory 
Committee, Transportation Aesthetics Review Committee, and Freight Transportation 
Advisory Committee (MPO 2006). 
 The Citizens Transportation Advisory Committee commissioned a study in 
2007: Simulation and Analysis of Potential Mass Evacuation of Miami-Dade 
Residents (Gannet Fleming 2007).  The focus of the study was on traffic volume and 
capacity during a mass evacuation, namely a large, atypical, mass evacuation.  Given 
Miami’s relatively low storm surge risk and strict building codes, hurricane 
evacuation orders typically involve only those areas of the County that lay within the 
narrow storm surge risk area and trailer parks. This study of mass evacuation was 
somewhat inspired by the disasters associated with Hurricane Katrina and Rita.   
 The Simulation and Analysis of Potential Mass Evacuation of Miami-Dade 
Residents was intended to identify strategies to perform such a massive evacuation 
with so few inbound and outbound major traffic routes.  The analysis evaluated 
contraflow strategies, road shoulder driving, and gas station locations.  The study gave 
extra consideration to carless and special needs populations by mapping such 
populations as, disabled, carless, low-income, and those belonging to one of two age 
cohorts (under 18 and over 65).  This information has been translated into the strategic 
placement of the Miami-Dade Transit pick up sites, which at the time of the study, 
numbered 130 throughout the county.   
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City / County Level Plans: Miami-Dade County 
 The State Management Act delegates certain responsibilities to the county 
level.  These responsibilities include the development of county level comprehensive 
emergency management programs.  In the case of an emergency incident, the Miami-
Dade Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (DEM&HS) is 
the lead agency coordinating the emergency response. 
 The DEM&HS developed the county’s Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Plan (Miami-Dade CEMP).  Although it addresses multiple hazards, 
hurricane response is the majority of the plan.  The ‘Response’ portion of the Miami-
Dade CEMP outlines a timeline for response efforts.  The timeline is based upon the 
hurricane impact as hour zero.  The CEMP response timeline begins at 72 hours 
before landfall and lasts until 48 hours after landfall.  During that timeframe, activities 
outlined within the CEMP are carried out: contraflow evacuation traffic, paratransit 
pickup of those on the County’s disaster registry list, bus pickup of carless 
populations, etc.   These activities are carried out by the providers and agencies that 
have agreements with the OEM&HS and that fulfill a role within the Miami-Dade 
CEMP.  The most prominent of these agencies would be Miami-Dade Transit and the 
American Red Cross, for their evacuation and sheltering services, respectively.     
 Miami-Dade Transit (MDT) designates many of its employees as “essential” 
during an emergency, including bus operations, maintenance and paratransit.  These 
“essential” employees have a clear emergency response role as part of their job 
description.  The paratransit operations are obligated to the Special Transportation 
Service, Medicaid Transportation Services, and those registered with the Department 
of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (DEM&HS) as Persons with 
Special Needs.  The paratransit operations and bus operations would continue until 
each person needing assistance is evacuated or until weather conditions threaten 
operations (MDT 2008). 
 Paratransit’s first priority is the Special Transportation Services and Medicaid 
clients, especially those on dialysis.  Paratransit efforts, assisted by contracted service 
providers are prioritized towards the Special Transportation Services and Medicaid 
clients, and then all others including those registered as ‘Persons with Special Needs’ 
(MDT 2008).    
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 Miami-Dade Transit manages sixty-three 
evacuation-bus pick-up sites throughout the storm surge 
evacuation zones (see Figure 1).  Each pick-up site is 
appropriately signed with a tri-lingual sign 36” tall by 
24” wide.  Furthermore, the MDT has seventy-five 
additional pick-up points at mobile home parks, which 
are located throughout Miami-Dade County and are not 
limited to the storm surge evacuation zones due to the 
increased risk faced by mobile home residents.  The 
evacuees are brought to one of the twenty Red Cross 
evacuation centers (MDT 2008).   
Additional information about the evacuation 
process is available to the public on the Miami Dade County website and through 
brochures such as the Hurricane Guide which is also available in English, Español 
and Creole.  Location is one of the most important pieces of information for the public 
that influences their decision to evacuate.  Only certain portions of the city face the 
possibility of a mandatory evacuation, a clear distinction from the New Orleans 
evacuation plan. 
 The storm surge evacuation zones are limited to coastal storm surge areas and 
a block-shaped area of 8.5 square miles (marked in red with the letter ‘A’ in Figure 2).  
The storm surge areas were designated using computer modeling.  Additionally, the 
8.5 square mile area is designated for evacuation because it would be inaccessible to 
first responders following a large storm (MDT 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Pick-Up Site 
Signage 
Source: MDT 2008 
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         Figure 2: Miami-Dade County Hurricane Storm Surge Evacuation Zones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Source: MDT 2008 
 
 Evacuees from the general population are encouraged to seek shelter with 
family or friends inland from the evacuation zones.  There are approximately fifty-one 
Red Cross Evacuation Centers available with an estimated total occupancy of around 
60,000 to 70,000 people, but not every shelter would necessarily be open during a 
given evacuation.  Citizens must tune into the local news or call the ‘Answer Center’ 
(305-468-5900) to receive information regarding which shelters will be open (Mogen 
2008).  Additionally, shelters are equipped with electric generators for persons with 
special needs. 
 The DEM&HS also operates a special needs evacuation registry, known as the 
Emergency Evacuation Assistance Program (EEAP).  As of November 2007, 
approximately 2,500 people were registered with the EEAP (Renne et al. 2008 page 
9).  People who need mobility and/or medical assistance to evacuate are encouraged 
to apply to the EEAP program.  They will be provided appropriate transportation and 
shelter in a special needs evacuation center.  They are allowed to be accompanied by a 
caregiver if necessary.   
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 The EEAP application must be signed by a doctor.  The application 
information is used by DEM&HS to determine the applicant’s eligibility and specific 
needs in case of an emergency.  The application is offered in three languages English, 
Creole and Spanish; additionally, Braille application forms are available.  
 When a situation occurs which may require evacuation, emergency response 
personnel call the registered person and request that they prepare for evacuation.  
They are asked to bring any required medical equipment and/or medications, such as 
personalized mobility devices.  Additionally, evacuees are asked to bring blankets, 
water, food (particularly for those with a special diet), clothes, money, identification, 
important papers.  The Special Needs Evacuation Centers are equipped with electric 
generators to power medical support equipment (EEAP 2008).    
 The DEM&HS promotes registration by encouraging care providers to assist 
in the registration of their clients by calling 311.  Additionally, the DEM&HS gives 
priority to those persons who have registered before an impending emergency.  Last 
minute registrations are addressed, but DEM&HS reminds potential applicants that in 
an emergency with little preparation time, other than a hurricane, persons who are 
already registered will be assisted.  During a hurricane evacuation, the Emergency 
Operation Center will make public media announcements to notify the public when 
the 311 Answer Center will stop accepting registrations for special needs assisted 
evacuation (EEAP 2008). 
 During the National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning 
Focus Groups in 2007, the DEM&HS mentioned their considerations for sheltering-
in-place to compliment the EEAP.  They were concerned that participation in this 
program has been historically low, anecdotally around twenty percent.  An evacuation 
of all, one hundred percent, of the registered persons would have to begin very early, 
possibly even before a hurricane’s point of landfall has been accurately forecasted. 
(Renne et al. 2008) 
 Evacuation planning is not exclusive to hurricane planning in Miami-Dade 
County.  The Miami-Dade CEMP plans for risks other than hurricanes.  Planning has 
also been done for potential emergencies related to Turkey-Point Nuclear Facility, 
particularly a mandatory area within a ten-mile radius of the facility, which includes 
nearly all of the Homestead community.  Miami-Dade County Code, Chapter 8 B, 
Section 15 calls for certain facilities such as assisted living, schools, hospitals, day 
care centers, and other facilities, to have a self-sufficient emergency plan, including 
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evacuation. Special facilities are institutions that include, but are not limited to 
assisted living facilities, schools (public and private), daycare centers, elderly centers 
or other organizations.  These plans must be developed for both natural and 
technological disasters.  The primary planning difference for consideration is the 
sudden notification of a technological disaster.  The Miami-Dade Emergency 
Operations Center will transmit emergency information to media sources within 15 
minutes of the appropriate response decision.  Additionally, these special facilities 
maintain all-hazard radios and receive basic emergency notifications from the 
DEM&HS via the National Weather Service (DEM&HS 2004).  
 The DEM&HS is currently running a pilot program for Miami-Dade Alerts.  It 
is a system which will send emergency text message alerts to subscribing emails, cell 
phones, and mobile devices.  Citizens can sign up for the alerts online which may be 
selected in English, Spanish, or Creole.  However, these alerts are text only, thus 
restricting access for the sight-impaired.  Additionally, subscribing for the service can 
only be done online, thus restricting access for those without Internet.    
 
The Community Level: Miami 
 There are several Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) in the 
Miami area.  The Miami Beach team does receive “some training to deal with people 
with mobility impairments as part of the fire safety, evacuation, and suppression 
(training) module” particularly in regard to high-rise building evacuations (Mogen 
2008).  Additionally, there is “some training in the curriculum to address hurricane 
evacuation for persons with special needs,” particularly by spreading the word about 
the disaster registry (Mogen 2008).  During an actual evacuation, the CERT 
volunteers evacuate just as a normal citizen would.  They do not serve as volunteers 
during the event (Mogen 2008). 
 Hospitals and nursing homes must do evacuation planning in Miami-Dade 
County.  There have mandatory evacuation plans and two agreements with receiving 
facilities.  The private ambulance companies assist these evacuations; their 
involvement is an ambulance-licensing requirement.  DEM&HS sends out the 
evacuation list and Red Cross coordinates the evacuation of such hospitals and 
nursing homes.  Three major hospitals, Homestead, Mercy and Mount Sinai, have 
been cleared to shelter-in-place through a category five hurricane (Renne et al. 2008). 
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Discussion of Planning Efforts: Miami 
 At the state level, the Florida Division of Emergency Management has clearly 
outlined the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan    with designations of 
responsibilities, particularly Emergency Support Functions.  Regarding carless and 
special needs evacuations; ESF 1, Transportation, and ESF 8, Health and Medical 
Services, as written in the CEMP, designate the responsibilities of assisting the 
evacuations of carless and special needs persons to specific state agencies.  
 However, the thoroughness with which these ESFs have been developed in 
order to address carless and special needs is unclear.  In the case of Miami-Dade 
County, a carless and special needs evacuation would occur utilizing solely the 
county’s resources, particularly the Miami-Dade Transit buses and paratransit 
vehicles.  This also distinguishes an evacuation of Miami from an evacuation of New 
Orleans which relies heavily upon transportation resources from the State of 
Louisiana.   
Emergency Support Function 8 in the Florida CEMP, states its responsibilities 
as including “public health response, triage, treatment and transportation of victims of 
disaster; assistance in the evacuation of victims out of the disaster area after the event; 
immediate support to hospitals and nursing homes…” (CEMP 2004, appendix VIII).  
However, Miami-Dade County Code requires that these facilities, hospitals and 
nursing homes, develop self-sufficiency plans.  Whether or not the state agencies of 
ESF 8 intend to provide their services regardless of existing facility plans or merely as 
back up when existing facility plans fail is unclear.  Although this may seem unclear 
within the plans themselves, the reality is that Miami-Dade has ample experience with 
evacuations.  Consequently, this issue could be easily clarified by translating their 
operational knowledge into the documented plans. 
 The logistical issues surrounding carless and special needs evacuations are 
designated as responsibilities within the CEMP.  It appears that the majority of 
specific efforts addressing these needs occur at the county level with some notable 
exceptions such as an executive order regarding prescription medications.  The order 
mandates the state’s health insurance companies and Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs) to lift certain restrictions on prescription refills, which would 
allow people to adequately prepare for evacuation (Gallagher 2005). 
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 The ‘Sheltering’ portion of the CEMP’s ‘Method of Operation’ deals with the 
efforts which have been made to address the sheltering deficit.  In 2000, the sheltering 
deficit was measured to be 1,501,932 evacuees more than shelter space allowed in the 
case of a Category Five hurricane.  This deficit has been reduced to 1,035,371; and 
the state continues to execute a shelter deficit elimination strategy, which involves 
surveying buildings and even designing new public building projects according to 
shelter-design criteria. 
 In Miami-Dade County, shelter availability, the 63 Miami-Dade Transit 
(MDT) bus pick-up locations throughout the storm surge areas with tri-lingual signs, 
the disaster registry and paratransit evacuation assistance all come together and 
function in a tried and true manner.  The experience that DEM&HS has is 
irreplaceable with any training simulation.  Their Emergency Management Plan and 
their work in collaboration with the state and other counties as outlined in the state’s 
Regional Evacuation Procedure cumulate into valuable experience.  Unfortunately, 
the extent to which this valuable experience has been translated into logistical 
improvements of the carless and special needs evacuation effort is unclear because the 
county’s Emergency Management Plan is not available to the public.  Additionally, 
the MDT’s Hurricane Manual simplistically designates responsibilities and 
procedures, yet yields little information about real experience. 
 Lastly, the State of Florida funds a portion of its emergency management in a 
unique way.  A tax levied on insurance premiums goes towards a municipal 
firefighters’ trust fund, a police officers’ retirement trust fund, and an emergency 
management fund.  This alternative funding source for emergency management may 
have viability in other states as well. 
 
Recommendations: Miami 
 Miami’s carless and special needs evacuation is exemplar among the case 
study cities.  The primary recommendation would be for the Miami-Dade Department 
of Emergency Management and Homeland Security to continue to openly share its 
planning efforts with other cities’ emergency management offices.  Knowledge of the 
finer points of Miami’s evacuation planning efforts could save other cities from 
committing mistakes that Miami has already learned from long ago.  
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Introduction 
Case Study: New Orleans 
  In Louisiana, evacuation planning is a shared responsibility between 
parish governments and the state government.  At the state level, the Governor’s 
Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) has developed 
the State of Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan of 2007.  This plan serves to 
coordinate the activities of multiple state agencies to provide evacuation services from 
defined pick-up locations in each of the state’s 64 parishes.  It is the responsibility of 
each parish to transport persons needing evacuation assistance to these pick-up 
locations by implementing Parish Emergency Operations Plans.  In the case of 
Orleans Parish, the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness has created The 
New Orleans City Assisted Evacuation Plan (CAEP) and neighboring Jefferson Parish 
created the Publically Assisted Evacuation Plan.   
 The CAEP is of particular interest due to Hurricane Katrina.  The plan was 
obviously not implemented, and carless and special needs people were given no 
evacuation transit assistance before the hurricane.  The recent form of the CAEP, 
currently updated annually, is a major improvement to the City’s efforts for carless 
and special needs populations.  After all, how could the nation’s largest failed 
evacuation in 2005 effect evacuation planning throughout the nation and not in the 
very city where the failure occurred?  The new CAEP calls for a coordinated 
evacuation involving open-public bus evacuation, elderly and disabled train 
evacuation, paratransit assistance, a registry, and even pet evacuation and sheltering.  
Hurricane Ike in 2008 was the first time that the CAEP was executed in response to a 
real threat.  Clearly, the eyes of the nation were upon New Orleans’ response to 
Hurricane Ike, namely the evacuation process.  Luckily, the research within this case 
study was still in its final stages when the 2008 evacuation occurred.        
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State Level Plans: Louisiana 
 The Governor’s Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness 
(GOHSEP) has the responsibility of directing emergency and/or disaster operations in 
the State of Louisiana by an executive order from the Governor.  Part of this 
responsibility includes the development of the State of Louisiana Emergency 
Operations Plan.  The plan’s central purpose is to delineate a chain-of-command and 
designate responsibilities and tasks among various state, local and other entities.   
 Emergency management is divided in five phases in the plan:  prevention, 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Nearly a third of the State of 
Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan deals with risk assessment.  The state’s 
vulnerability has been assessed for 
each of a long list of natural, 
technological, intentional acts, and 
biological hazards.  As expected, 
the state’s vulnerability to 
hurricanes and storm surges is 
considered catastrophic.  Addition-
ally, the plan lists coastal erosion 
as a natural hazard with a high 
vulnerability rating.  Coastal 
erosion equals a loss of wetlands 
that serve as hurricane and storm 
surge protection for places like 
New Orleans. 
 The City of New Orleans 
has even less natural protection 
from storm surges, considering 
that 217 square miles of Louisiana 
coastal wetlands were lost after 
Hurricane Katrina and Rita (USGS 
2006).  A common anecdote in 
New Orleans is that the loss due to 
the hurricanes was equal to 50 years of loss at normal rates (see figure 3).  
Figure 3: Satellite Imagery of 
Coastal Wetlands: 
Before and After Katrina, 2005 
 
       Zaffos 2008 
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 In addition to the risk assessment portion of the State of Louisiana Emergency 
Operations Plan, the plan designates a Unified Command Structure, which outlines 
the chain-of-command and the designation of responsibilities.   This command 
structure is a reflection of the national policy guidance within the National Response 
Framework. GOHSEP is at the top of the organizational tree, managing four branches: 
transportation, human services, emergency services, and infrastructure.   The agencies 
within each branch are assigned using the common nomenclature: emergency support 
functions (see figure 4). 
Figure 4: GOHSEP’s Unified Command Structure 
 
      Source: LOP 2007 
 
  
 
 As Figure 4 depicts, the Transportation/Pre-Storm Evacuation Branch under 
GOHSEP consists of several ESF’s or Emergency Support Functions.  ESF-1 
Transportation consists of the Department of Transportation and Development 
(DOTD) which is responsible for providing the transportation resources to evacuate 
people in need.  The DOTD is able to coordinate private, volunteer transportation 
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resources outside of the state’s fleet of vehicles and even National Guard assistance, 
to facilitate the evacuation effort.  This includes provisions for transportation 
resources for ‘at-risk populations’ as well.  The ESF 1 has a designated Coordinator 
which collaborates with other entities in developing evacuation plans and 
transportation resource inventories.  Those entities include: 
 1. The Louisiana National Guard 
 2. Department of Agriculture and Forestry 
 3. The Department of Corrections 
 4. The Department of Education 
 5. Governor- Office of Elderly Affairs 
 6. Department of Health and Hospitals 
 7. The Public Service Commission 
 8. Louisiana Board of Regents 
 9. Louisiana State Police 
 10. The Department of Wildlife and Fisheries 
 11. Volunteer Organizations 
 
 Certain ESFs are more closely relate to carless and special needs evacuation 
planning than others.  The Emergency Support Function 6 (ESF 6): Mass Care, 
Housing and Human Service Annex is responsible for sheltering and feeding 
programs.  The Department of Health and Hospitals coordinates the ESF 6 to provide 
medical assistance at the shelters.  The ESF 6 includes responsibility for collecting 
and providing information about the evacuees through the Disaster Welfare 
Information System.  This system assists in reuniting family members separated 
during an emergency.  
 Emergency Support Function 8:  Public Health and Medical Services Annex is 
primarily overseen by the Department of Health and Hospitals whose responsibility is 
“for public health, sanitation, medical and health assistance to Special Needs shelter 
operations” (LOP 2007, page ESF 8-1). 
 ESF 13: Public Safety is primarily controlled by the State Police and the 
Department of Justice.  They have a wide-ranging responsibility to protect public 
safety by, among other things, controlling evacuation traffic.  In the case of New 
Orleans, evacuation traffic was well managed during Hurricane Katrina by the use of 
the contraflow model (see figure 5). 
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Figure 5:  Metropolitan New Orleans Contraflow Plan 
 
Source: http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/evacinfo/no_contraflow.htm 
 
 Emergency Support Function 1, Transportation is most applicable to carless 
and special needs evacuees, it is the responsibility of each parish to transport persons 
needing evacuation assistance to the pick-up locations by implementing Parish 
Emergency Operations Plans such as the City Assisted Evacuation Plan (CAEP) of 
the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness.  The State of Louisiana 
Emergency Operations Plan 2007 takes over when the parish transfers evacuees to the 
transportation providers contracted by the Department of Transportation and 
Development (DOTD).  They take evacuees to American Red Cross shelters 
throughout the region.  During Hurricane Ike in 2008, many evacuees were 
discouraged by the state’s secrecy regarding shelter locations, and the sheltering 
experiences varied greatly among evacuees.  Some evacuees were sheltered with all 
accommodations, while others lacked sufficient facilities and staff. GOHSEP has 
created the State of Louisiana Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Volume 1.  This second 
plan repeats the key responsibilities as outlined in the Louisiana Emergency 
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Operations Plan with regards to evacuations.  As the title suggests, it is a mitigation 
plan focused upon reducing the ill effects of natural disasters.  Although critical for 
New Orleans, the State of Louisiana Hazard Mitigation Plan Update Volume 1 was 
not further researched do to its lack of information specific to evacuation planning. 
 
Metropolitan Planning Organization Plans: New Orleans 
 The Regional Planning Commission (RPC) is the metropolitan planning 
organization of the greater New Orleans area.  Although they do not have a primary 
emergency support function, they have offered invaluable technical assistance to 
emergency planners.  They assisted the Louisiana State Police by using traffic 
simulation models to calibrate the contraflow traffic, which was first used in the 
Hurricane Ivan evacuation in 2004.  Additionally, they worked with the University of 
New Orleans Center for Hazard Assessment, Response and Technology on a project 
to identify special needs populations within New Orleans, as well as related GIS 
mapping assistance. (Pedro, RPC 2009) 
 
City / County Level Plans: New Orleans 
 The New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness has developed the City 
Assisted Evacuation Plan (CAEP) to offer evacuation assistance to the people of 
Orleans Parish who cannot self-evacuate before a hurricane.  The CAEP functions to 
pick up people throughout New Orleans at various location including four senior 
center bus pick-up locations, thirteen general public pick-up locations, two hotel pick-
up locations, paratransit residential pick-up locations, and in addition, people may 
arrive directly to one of the appropriate staging areas.  The hotel pick-up locations are 
intended for tourists who already have airline tickets; their staging area is the Louis 
Armstrong International Airport (MSY) and their evacuation is dependent upon the 
airlines.  Other tourists without cars or airline tickets may enter the CAEP as a 
member of the public via general public pick-up locations.   
 At the general public pick-up locations, evacuees are transported on Regional 
Transit Authority (RTA) buses to their staging area, the New Orleans Arena; their 
evacuation then becomes dependent upon the evacuation planning of the State of 
Louisiana, GOHSEP; and their destination was to be confidential for security reasons.  
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However, emergency planners realized that this secrecy discouraged people from 
evacuating and the policy has been revised.   
 The senior center pick-up locations and paratransit residential pickups are 
intended for seniors or persons who need medical resources (NMRs).  The NMRs 
and/or seniors may be accompanied by one caregiver.  Their staging area is the Union 
Passenger Terminal.  Their evacuation is dependent upon Amtrak, and their 
destination is Memphis, Tennessee.  For cases requiring a higher level of medical 
assistance, they may be transported to Belle Chase Naval Air Field, other helicopter 
interceptor sites, or other airfields.   
 The general public, seniors and NMR’s may arrive at either the general public 
pick-up locations (GPPL’s), the senior center pick-up locations (SCPL’s), directly at 
the Union Passenger Terminal (UPT) or the New Orleans Arena (NOA) staging areas.  
Transportation will be offered between the UPT and the NOA staging areas so that 
evacuees may arrive to the appropriate staging area regardless of their point of entry 
in the CAEP. 
 An integral part of the CAEP is the classification of NMR and senior evacuees 
in one of four categories.  The CAEP uses a colored wristband system to easily 
identify these evacuees.  Blue wristbands are for seniors of 65 years of age or older 
who will evacuate by bus or rail.  Green wristbands are self-manageable patients who 
will evacuate by bus or rail.  Yellow wristbands are for general NMRs whose 
transportation needs are determined by the Transportation Triage Officer.  Red 
wristbands are for NMRs who require immediate medical assistance.  The Red 
wristbanded NMRs are transported by ambulance to Belle Chase Naval Air Field, a 
helicopter interceptor site, or other location.   
 The City of New Orleans estimated that 20,000 people would be evacuated 
under the CAEP.  An estimated 14,000 would travel through the NOA staging area 
and 6,000 seniors or NMR’s would travel through the UPT staging area.  An 
additional 5,000 to 50,000 tourists could be in the city at any given time, in addition 
to the 20,000 people to be evacuated by the CAEP.  However, the City of New 
Orleans takes into consideration that most of these tourists have cars or, at least, 
airline return tickets.  The plan designates two hotel pickup locations and begins using 
local charter buses to move tourists to the airport.  This phase of the plan begins at H-
58, or 58 hours before the hurricane makes landfall on the Gulf Coast.   
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 The CAEP begins a process called ‘leaning forward’ as early as 84 hours 
before the hurricane’s coastal landfall.  The ‘leaning forward’ phase includes the 
preparation of the staging areas, coordination of buses, railcars, etc.  At H-54, the 
CAEP takes effect for all evacuees.  At that time, the general public and senior center 
pick-up locations open, designated RTA buses begin running evacuation services (2 
buses per pick-up location), while 40 more buses continue to offer normal routes 
(limited), the first Amtrak train is available for loading, the New Orleans Arena is 
receiving evacuees, 100 state buses arrive at the Arena, and paratransit begins 
residential pick-ups. 
 The paratransit operations for residential pick-ups are coordinated by the 311 
Center and the Residential Evacuation Assistance Pickup (REAP) Operations Plan.  
The 311 Center functions as the control center for these operations.  The City of New 
Orleans promotes pre-registry with the 311 system, however evacuees needing 
residential assistance may call 911 or 311 at the onset of an emergency.  Call center 
operators will screen the callers to determine their need level.  The information is then 
passed through the Area Commander who dispatches a bus, ambulance or other 
transportation.  The operations of REAP will continue until everyone requesting 
assistance has received it.  Broadening the definition of ‘residential’ in the REAP, the 
Area Commander sends buses to locations where seniors often congregate, other than 
the 17 planned pick-up locations, such as homeless shelters. 
 The CAEP includes a Hospital and Care Centers Evacuation Operations Plan, 
which has very close coordination with the ESF 8 of the Louisiana Emergency 
Operations Plan which includes such things as ambulances.  Each hospital has 
developed various plans to stay-in-place, partially evacuate or completely evacuate.  
Additionally, each hospital initiates one of these various plans at different storm 
levels.  For example, Children’s Hospital has a stay-in-place plan for Category 3 and 
4 hurricanes, and a full evacuation plan for a Category 5 hurricane.  On the other 
hand, University Hospital initiates a full evacuation for a Category 3 hurricane.   
 The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals requires an evacuation plan 
before nursing home and home health agencies can be licensed.  Although, it is 
unclear if these plans have over-booked local transportation resources.  One step to 
limit this conflict by the CAEP has been to develop contracts with coach buses from 
outside the City, therefore leaving local companies available for local nursing home 
contracts. 
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 The CAEP also includes a Pet Evacuation Plan.  The City of New Orleans 
anticipates offering shelter for some 10,000 pets.  These pets are not allowed in 
American Red Cross Shelters; therefore, they will be sheltered separately.  The 
Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) has developed 
extensive planning to pick up pets at both the UPT and NOA staging areas.  Pets in 
carriers or muzzled will be allowed on RTA buses which will bring the evacuees and 
their pets to the staging areas.  The SPCA will barcode pets and owners to facilitate 
later reuniting of pets with their families.  
 In August of 2008, Hurricane Gustav provided the opportunity to give the 
CAEP a trial run.  The storm could have been disastrous for New Orleans, but luckily 
damage was minimal; except for the power outages which were wide spread 
throughout the region.  
 The wristband identification system will need revisiting; during the evacuation 
for Hurricane Gustav the logistics of this system were cumbersome due to the crowds 
attempting to board buses after long waits at several pickup locations.  In many cases, 
the evacuees were registered while aboard the buses or trains.  This was risky 
however because the registry also serves as the manifest for that vehicle, and if an 
accident were to have occurred before the manifest was completed there could 
potentially be hundreds of unidentified victims. 
 The wait time at the 17 pick up locations varied greatly from location to 
location.  The CAEP initially dedicates two buses per pick up location.  However, 
many pick up locations are farther from the staging area than others, thus having 
longer round trips for the buses that will not be able to pick up the same number of 
evacuees per hour as the buses servicing closer pick up locations. 
 The sheltering experience varied greatly among evacuees as well.  Some of the 
shelters were heavily criticized for having inadequate services, while others were 
praised.  This and other Gustav experiences will be discussed in the discussion 
section. 
 
Discussion of Planning Efforts: New Orleans 
 The Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan (LOP) does not include the type of 
specific details regarding evacuation planning that can be found in the parish-level 
plans.  The LOP does, however, clearly designate responsibilities and duties of the 
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various entities that will participate in emergency management.  One such notable 
designation of responsibility for special needs evacuees is the Emergency Support 
Function 8:  Public Health and Medical Services Annex.  This is an important 
designation because of the clear, indisputable responsibility to special needs 
populations.   
 The LOP did not originally disclose the location of the state shelters for 
security reasons.   However, for many people it was unclear what those security 
reasons would be, particularly concerning hurricane evacuations, ‘confidentiality’ 
seemed inappropriate.  This policy has since been revised because planners saw that 
evacuees in New Orleans would be reluctant to go to the New Orleans Arena staging 
area because they would not have any idea where the state buses will take them.   
 During the evacuation from Hurricane Gustav, many people wanted to know 
their destination and wanted to arrive at the same shelter as family and friends.  The 
coordination of the shelters alone was a logistical challenge.  The American Red 
Cross provides a total of 343 shelters in 10 different states, sheltering around 60,000 
evacuees (ARC 2008).  The registration of evacuees with wristbands is very crucial 
when considering the complexity of the sheltering network and the public’s desire to 
be located with family and friends (see figure 6). 
Figure 6: Peak Shelter Locations during Hurricane Gustav 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
GOHSEP 2008 
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The LOP essentially serves the purposes of transporting evacuees from the 
parish staging areas.  The collection of evacuees at these parish staging areas is the 
parish’s responsibility.  In the case of Orleans Parish, this effort is executed according 
to the City Assisted Evacuation Plan (CAEP).  The CAEP and LOP declare that the 
New Orleans Arena staging area will initially have 100 buses dedicated to the state’s 
evacuation effort.  In total, the state had agreements with providers for 700 buses, of 
which only 150 buses were initially provided for the Hurricane Gustav evacuation.  
The National Guard provided drivers for an additional number of school buses 
utilized in the leg of the evacuation from the parish staging area to the state shelters.  
FEMA sent an additional 150 ambulances to assist with the special needs evacuation, 
mostly from homes to the train station/staging area.  Ultimately, 9,000 persons 
needing medical assistance were evacuated, including 8,000 nursing home residents 
(GOHSEP 2008, Jervis 2008). 
 In order to bring evacuees to the staging area, the CAEP initially designates 
two RTA buses for every one of the 17 pick-up locations throughout the city.  The 
plan allows more buses to be assigned to the pick-up locations as necessary.  This is 
an important consideration because more buses will most likely be needed as the 
hurricane draws or the number of evacuees arriving to pick up locations increases.  
However, the CAEP should consider certain other factors, which would affect the 
number of buses needed per pickup location, namely the concentration of carless 
population in certain areas and the distance from the pick-up locations to the staging 
area.  Longer distances will increase travel times, particularly during high evacuation 
traffic.  Increased travel times will decrease the efficiency of people evacuated per 
hour, thus necessitating more buses.  For example, the travel time from the pick-up at 
Mary Queen of Vietnam in eastern New Orleans to the staging area is approximately 
40 minutes on a normal day, which means that one bus with a 44 person occupancy 
can only achieve an overall efficiency of 23 evacuees per hour.  However, the pick-up 
at the Municipal Auditorium is only five minutes away from the staging area, which 
means that one bus can achieve an efficiency of 59 evacuees per hour (assuming 
loading and unloading times totaling 35 minutes in both cases).  Dedicating more 
buses to the distant pick up locations and those locations with high numbers of 
evacuees could reduce the wait times experienced during the Gustav evacuation.       
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Recommendations: New Orleans 
 One of the main critiques of the Hurricane Gustav evacuation was the delayed 
return of the assisted evacuees after the storm.  Power outages in New Orleans 
delayed the return of the evacuees to the city.  This delay amplified the discontent felt 
by evacuees in state shelters.  A more prompt return of evacuees has numerous 
benefits and this aspect of the evacuation plan should be more clearly addressed for 
future events.  An evacuation is expensive for everyone, individuals, businesses and 
governments.  For many individuals, the days spent away from home are also days 
without work and without pay.  For businesses, the days spent closed result in lost 
revenue.  For local governments, each day that business aren’t generating sales tax or 
paying income tax are akin to tax holidays and decrease the city’s revenue.  The 
individual costs of evacuating have been partially addressed by the State of Louisiana 
Department of Social Services with the issuance of disaster relief monies in the form 
of food stamp debit cards valuing up to a few hundred dollars, depending upon the 
applicant’s circumstances.     
  During the Gustav evacuation, the evacuee registration system (wristbanding) 
was cumbersome. This will also need to be addressed in future planning.  One 
possible way to do this would be self-registration kiosks at pick up locations. 
 The dedication of buses to particular pick up locations will also need to be 
addressed.  Ideally, more buses would be provided to distant pick up locations and/or 
pick up locations with a high concentration of carless people.  
 The above recommendations were discussed by evacuation planners in a 
recent tabletop exercise.  The notes from this important and informative meeting are 
included in the appendix.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: Case Studies 
 
36 
 The New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) developed the 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, which consists of three volumes: 
Volume 1: All-Hazard Mitigation Plan, Volume 2: Response and Short-Term 
Recovery and Volume 3: Long-Term Recovery Plan.  The All-Hazard Plan focuses on 
reducing property damage and loss of life from natural hazards.  One might expect 
emergency planning in New York City to focus on terrorism; however the City faces 
high risk from storm surge flooding as demonstrated thoroughly in SEMO’s 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan’s risk assessment.  Therefore, the state 
supports the City’s efforts in the development of an evacuation plan for the storm 
surge risk areas.  
 In New York City (NYC), evacuation planning is the responsibility of the 
Office of Emergency Management (OEM), supervised by the Mayor.  The efforts of 
the OEM depend upon the cooperation of approximately 130 state and local entities, 
which include government authorities, nonprofits and private corporations (Brodsky 
2006).  The OEM has developed several plans that include evacuation efforts, 
including the Coastal Storm Plan, the Trans-Hudson Emergency Transportation Plan 
and other confidential plans, which primarily address security threats.  The OEM 
developed many of these plans in collaboration with the New York State Emergency 
Management Office (SEMO).  These plans are held in confidentiality, with only select 
information available online for the public such as the location of shelter reception 
centers.   
 In the 2005 New York State Legislature, the Assembly Committee on 
Corporations, Authorities and Commissions, chaired by Assemblyman Richard L. 
Brodsky, launched a six-month study on New York City’s evacuation planning.  Their 
study included public hearings and subpoenas for key documents.  The resulting 
report, issued March 23, 2006 (referred to herein as the Brodsky Report), offered key 
insights into the planning process that otherwise could not have been discovered given 
the confidentiality of the plans. 
Case Study: New York 
 New York planning efforts have been focused on two primary areas: terrorism 
and coastal storms.  These plans are kept mostly confidential; the public is made 
aware of things like the location of the nearest evacuee reception center in case of 
hurricane risk.  The strength in New York has been the public’s awareness of the need 
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for emergency planning on the personal and family level.  The public education 
efforts made by the Office of Emergency Management cover a wide variety of 
circumstances, and offer the widest variety of languages compared to any of the other 
case study cities.  
 
State Level Plans: New York State 
 Every three years, SEMO updates the New York State Standard Multi-Hazard 
Mitigation Plan, which fulfills their obligation to mitigate the effects of potentially 
disastrous natural hazards, as outlined in the Federal Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 and the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.  
In addition to fulfilling a requirement for such things as Federal disaster assistance, 
the New York State Standard Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan of 2008 is a guide for 
local governments to create mitigation plans, as required by the Disaster Mitigation 
Act. 
 The format of the Standard Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan clearly follows the 
requirements of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.  Although the plan did an 
excellent job of fulfilling each requirement, it did little to go beyond those concerning 
special needs populations.  The plan did not offer any mandates requiring that special 
needs populations be addressed.  One could assume that those responsibilities fell 
under the larger scope of the designation of responsibilities to execute evacuations.  
However, the list of participating state and local entities was too short to properly 
address the breadth of issues surrounding special needs evacuations. 
 The Standard Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan of 2008: Section 3: Hurricane 
Hazard Profile includes an important analysis of the potential disaster that a hurricane 
could cause throughout New York State.  SEMO utilized computer modeling software 
to estimate damages to NYC if it were hit directly by a storm identical to hurricane 
Katrina.  They estimated a $300 billion loss in just wind damage to buildings.  A slow 
moving category three hurricane with a direct hit to NYC was estimated to cause 40 
million tons of debris, 1.8 million displaced households and one-half million people 
with short-term shelter needs.   
 Although many people do not associate hurricanes with New York City, 
history speaks otherwise.  Storm surge floods have damaged the City in the past, such 
as the 1821 hurricane that flooded Lower Manhattan and the 1938 hurricane with 120 
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mph winds and a death toll of 600 people (Drye 2006).  In total, 11 hurricanes have 
struck the region in the last 120 years.   
   In the case of a Category 3 hurricane, storm surges could flood everything 
west of 7th Avenue, south of Broome Street, and east of 1st
Figure 7: NYC Hurricane Category 3 Storm Surge Water Depth Map 
 Avenue including Chelsea, 
Greenwich Village and East Village (Naparstek 2005).  Additionally, vast stretches of 
Brooklyn and Queens surrounding Jamaica Bay, including JFK International Airport, 
could be flooded during a Category 1 hurricane.  SEMO included an analysis of the 
potential storm surge due to a Category 3 hurricane in the New York State Standard 
Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan of 2008: Section 3: Hurricane Hazard Profile.  Figure 
7 shows the extent of potential storm surge. 
 
Source: SEMO GIS 
 The potential storm surges in New York are the highest of the entire east coast 
due to the New York bight (Naparstek 2005).  The bight refers to the topography of 
the coast and the expansive shallow sea floor.  Long Island creates a right angle with 
the New Jersey shoreline (Stoffer 1996).  These factors form a funnel-like 
topography, as seen in Figure 8, which results in an increase to the storm surge index.  
If identical storms were to strike NYC and anywhere else on the eastern seaboard, 
NYC would have higher storm surges due to the bight.    
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   Figure 8: The New York Bight 
 
                               Source: USGS 2001 
 
 The New York State Standard Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan of 2008, Section 
2 State Coordination Efforts & Capabilities describes the interagency collaborations 
and stakeholder involvements.  During the development of this plan, SEMO solicited 
input from stakeholders in New York State.  Of the participating entities, those with 
roles most directly connected to carless and special needs planning concerns included:  
the New York State Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, the 
Office of Mental Health, the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, the 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, and the American Red Cross.   
 
Metropolitan Planning Organization Plans: New York 
 The New York Metropolitan Transportation Council (NYMTC) is the 
metropolitan planning organization for New York City and surrounding areas, as far 
as Putnam, Rockland, and Suffolk Counties.  NYMTC focuses on regional 
transportation issues in a planning forum that brings together members from such 
agencies as the Federal Highway Administration and the New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority.  However, the presence of carless and special needs 
evacuation planning in the forum of the NYMTC is not evident.   
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City / County Level Plans: New York 
 The New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM), much like 
SEMO, has two types of evacuation and emergency response plans: natural and un-
natural or “area evacuations, in which specific areas of the entire City will be 
evacuated because of a serious disaster, including incidents without any advance 
notice (i.e. un-natural)” (Brodsky 2006, page 6).  The research for this case study was 
restricted by the OEM’s protection of confidentiality for both types of evacuation 
plans.  Requests for a copy of the Coastal Storm Plan are answered by the OEM with 
directions to the OEM’s website, which offers only public education materials; 
although beneficial to the average citizen, it offers little help to planning researchers.  
Therefore, the research for this case study relies heavily upon the Brodsky Report.  
However, even the Brodsky Report was narrowly focused on the Coastal Storm Plan 
because of the security-sensitivity of the other types of plans (Brodsky 2006). 
 The Coastal Storm Plan directly addresses the hurricane risk faced by NYC as 
outlined in SEMO’s risk analysis portion of the Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan.  The 
OEM is faced with the daunting task of reducing loss of life and property in one of the 
most densely populated places in the United States.  The bulk of the plan is focused 
on the evacuation of the low-lying coastal areas which would flood during a 
hurricane-induced storm surge.  The OEM has divided these coastal evacuation areas 
into three zones.  Zone A is the area to be evacuated in the case of a category one 
hurricane.  Zone B pertains to a category two, and Zone C is for category three 
hurricanes or stronger.  The population of all three zones is over 2.2 million people, 
45 percent of whom do not own a vehicle and might need some type of extra 
assistance to evacuate (see Table 2). 
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Table 3:  New York City’s Vulnerable Populations in Evacuation by Zone 
 Source: Qtd. Brodsky 2006 
 As one might expect, the evacuation zones are in direct following with 
SEMO’s Storm Surge Water Depth map.  The OEM’s Hurricane Evacuation Zone 
Map is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: New York City Hurricane Evacuation Zones 
 
Source: OEM 2008 
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 In Figure 9, the larger dots indicate the 23 reception centers throughout the 
city.  The Coastal Storm Plan creates 23 “solar systems” throughout the city (outside 
evacuation zones) which each have a reception center at their core and public shelters 
scattered around the area (see Figure 10).  In the first stage or tier one, evacuees are 
responsible for arriving at the reception centers.  In tier two, the evacuees are bussed 
to one of the 881 shelters throughout the city.  The Coastal Storm Plan calls for the 
evacuation to be phased or stepped.  To reduce the traffic congestion caused by the 
large number of anticipated evacuees, Zone A residents shall evacuate first, followed 
by Zone B, and lastly Zone C, in the case of a Category three hurricane. 
Figure 10: Example of NYC Solar System Model for Sheltering 
Source: OEM 2008 
 Citizens can find the closest evacuation center via the OEM website7, the 
OEM telephone hotline8
                                                 
7 www.nyc.gov/oem 
8 Number for non-emergency services: 311 (TTY: 212-504-4115). 
, or by consulting the Hurricane Evacuation Zone map.  The 
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OEM has been doing public outreach that focuses on such things as go-bags9, 
emergency supply kits, and household/business evacuation plans.  The Ready New 
York: Preparing for Emergencies in New York City guide and the Hurricanes and 
New York City guide are both available in eleven languages10.  The Ready New York: 
for Seniors and People with Disabilities is available in four languages11
 More evacuation planning efforts, besides the Coastal Storm Plan, came to 
light in this research via the New York Post.  The Trans-Hudson Emergency 
.  
Additionally, the OEM website allows users to sign-up for email alerts regarding 
emergency updates and advisories.   
 The Brodsky Report noted serious deficiencies in evacuation planning 
regarding special needs persons living independently throughout the City.  The MTA 
reported having 800 paratransit vehicles.  The Brodsky Report stated this would be 
severely inadequate for transporting the special needs population in NYC, which the 
OEM estimates to be “893,867 residents with a mobility disability” (OEM 2006, page 
13).  However, the 893,867 residents include those living independently and those 
living in institutions, which may be able to provide evacuation transportation to their 
residents.  NYC may have difficulties locating those residents living independently 
who need paratransit services to evacuate.  The evacuation plan identifies those 
needing paratransit by utilizing the databases of various agencies such as Meals on 
Wheels, NYS Department of Health, Department of Aging, and NYC Human 
Resources Administration. A centralized special needs registry would facilitate the 
process, and New York’s Mayor pledged to create it.  As of the date of creation of this 
report, no such registry had been developed. 
                                                 
9The ‘go-bag’ is a backpack with the absolute essentials to evacuate suddenly: important documents, 
keys, bankcards, cash, water, food, radio, prescriptions, etc. 
10 
 
 
11 
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Transportation Plan12 is designed to evacuate millions of people from Manhattan 
Island across the Hudson River to a staging area at New Jersey’s Liberty State Park.  
The plan incorporates the use of over 100 private vessels and the New York Harbor 
ferries.  Evacuees would be notified and given specific directions to the boats via 
television or radio.  The piers at West 39th
The Community Level: New York 
 Street and the World Financial Center 
would be utilized, as well as other undisclosed berths on the Hudson River.  This 
plan’s creation began following the 2003 blackout, which closed the subways and 
stranded millions (Alvarez, 2008).  The plan appears to be intended primarily for 
disasters that disable the subways by lack of electricity or flooding.  Unfortunately, 
more information regarding this plan is confidential.  
   
 The Brodsky Report criticized the OEM’s public outreach and education.  In 
the U.S. Army Corps study: 
- Over 85 percent did not recall seeing the OEM’s Ready New York Household     
Preparedness Guide, their principle outreach for weather-related disasters. 
- Over 75 percent of the people living in evacuation zones did not know they 
lived in a zone. 
 The Brodsky Report noted that the OEM was developing a better outreach 
strategy in cooperation with Columbia University.  Despite these critiques, the Army 
Corps study also noted that 25 percent of the respondents had prepared go bags.  
 The State Assembly critiqued these planning efforts on two distinct categories 
of special needs populations: those in institutions (hospitals, nursing homes, 
children’s homes, shelters, prisons, etc.) and those living independently throughout 
the New York City. 
 The Brodsky Report noted that 19 hospitals and 58 nursing homes are located 
within the hurricane evacuation zones.  Since 1985, law has required these facilities to 
have evacuations plans.  As of 2005, most of the institutions’ evacuation plans were 
only limited to simple facility evacuations due to localized fire or other factors.  The 
Assembly’s Preliminary Report noted these flaws in 2005 and the Department of 
                                                 
12 The information herein concerning the Trans-Hudson Emergency Transportation Plan is entirely 
secondary, courtesy of a New York Post article by Jimmy Alvarez in 2008.  The NYC OEM would not 
confirm or deny the existence of this plan to researchers in this study. 
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Health (DOH) and the Office of Emergency Management responded by requiring that 
all nursing homes and hospitals submit updated evacuation plans.  Unfortunately, 
many of these plans did not include transportation, or listed the same transportation 
contractor as several other plans, which would result in over-bookings and shortages 
if a regional evacuation were mandated.  Additionally, the Brodsky Report noted a 
complete absence of evacuation planning for group homes, shelters and other 
institutions with special needs persons, with the exception of jails and prisons. 
 
Discussion of Planning Efforts: New York 
 Given the confidentiality of the Office of Emergency Management’s Coastal 
Storm Plan, the Brodsky Report is an invaluable resource regarding the analysis of the 
plan.  The Brodsky Report noted that the two-tiered shelter system is “cumbersome” 
(Brodsky 2006).  Interestingly, FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers conducted a 
behavior analysis in 2004 by surveying over 1,500 New Yorkers about hurricane 
evacuation.  In the survey, for those people who said they would evacuate to the city’s 
shelters, surveyors explained the reception center two-tier system and asked again if 
they still intended to evacuate to the City’s shelters.  Only 60 percent still said they 
would still evacuate after hearing the explanation (USACE 2005).  In this two-tiered 
system, evacuees are responsible for arriving at the reception centers.  Unfortunately, 
the NYC OEM has not investigated the number of people that plan to reach the 
reception centers via public transportation, although the OEM does recommend that 
people use public transportation.  The OEM assumes that 1.8 million of the 3.4 
million evacuees will use public transportation.  The Brodsky Report noted that: 
“The MTA asserts that they have the capacity to move over a half a 
million people per hour via subway and 300,000 via bus, which the OEM 
believes is sufficient to evacuate all those needing transport.  However, 
officials testified that there has been no formal study to analyze the 
number of people who would evacuate via bus versus the number of 
people who would use the subway system (Brodsky 2006, page 31).”  
  
 Problems exist even for those driving private vehicles.  Only eleven reception 
centers, none of which is in Manhattan, have parking.  Additionally, nine reception 
centers are not accessible by subway.  Four more are not accessible by bus, including 
three centers that are not accessible by either bus or subway. 
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 The Brodsky Report cited an inadequate shelter capacity for NYC.  The OEM 
reported a shelter capacity to the State Assembly of 800,000 people, which is much 
less than the anticipated 3.4 million evacuees that would go to city shelters according 
to the Army Corps of Engineers (Brodsky 2006; USACE 2005).   The Brodsky Report 
highlighted the case of Staten Island which will have 86,518 evacuees seeking shelter 
according to the Army Corps of Engineers, but a shelter capacity of about half that.  It 
criticized the OEM’s “wishful thinking,” quoting Commissioner Bruno’s testimony, 
“we hope that not that many people will come to shelters” (Brodsky 2006).  However, 
despite the Assembly Committee’s critiques, the Commissioner may be right; the 
Army Corps of Engineers study did note that more that 70 percent of the people who 
indicated that they would go to a shelter also indicated that they have friends or family 
in other safe locations where they could go. 
 Timelines for the initiation and length of an evacuation are unclear, at least 
partially because no traffic congestion modeling has been developed.  Any anticipated 
timeframes could also be lengthened by the additional traffic congestion caused by 
“self evacuation,” the 71 percent of residents living outside evacuation zones who 
intended to also evacuate, as reported by the Army Corps of Engineers.  The central 
notion is that an evacuation notice to a specific geographic area incites evacuation 
throughout the surrounding area despite the potential consequences suffered by the 
population originally intended for evacuation.  For this same reason, the Assembly’s 
report explained that the Plan’s intention to phase the evacuation would not work.  
There are no mechanisms in place to prevent the residents living in Zones 2, 3, or 
non-evacuation zones from also evacuating at the same time, congesting the City’s 
street and putting those in Zone 1 in danger.  Additionally, the Brodsky Report 
criticized the inadequate travel lanes for inbound emergency vehicles and an unclear 
designation of responsibilities of agencies and authorities.    
 The capacity for evacuation based solely upon the physical structure of the city 
was studied by the American Highway Users Association (AHUA).  The AHUA 
considers automobiles to be the “Principle Evacuation Resource” since most 
households have one, and even carless households would most likely evacuate on bus 
(AHUA, p. 4).  The AHUA created an evacuation capacity index based upon ‘exit 
capacity,’ ‘internal traffic flow,’ and ‘automobile access.’  The AHUA analyzed the 
nation’s 37 urban areas with populations greater than one million.  New York scored a 
very low 14 out of 100 on its ‘exit capacity’, a score of 61 for its ‘internal traffic 
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flow,’ and the lowest score of all cities studied for its automobile access, i.e. the 
percentage of households that own cars (AHUA 2006).  Consequently, New York has 
the highest transit dependence in the United States.  New Orleans was number two on 
the list.  In New York, many people simply “choose not to have a car, despite having 
sufficient income” (AHUA 2006 p. 27). 
 An evacuation of NYC is a complicated issue due to many of the factors listed 
above.  During a focus group held in October of 2007, it was revealed that an 
evacuation of the entire city of New York would be a daunting and nearly impossible 
task (Renne et al. 2008).  NYC officials commented that pedestrian evacuations, i.e. 
on foot, might be the most efficient in the short-term (Renne et al. 2008).  In 2005, a 
poll revealed that 62 percent of New Yorkers “felt it was not possible to evacuate their 
neighborhoods” (McShane 2005).  
 The Brodsky Report made several recommendations to correct the errors 
highlighted in its report; and the Assembly Committee introduced legislation to 
facilitate the process.  The legislation proposes the required training of public 
employees on disaster preparedness, required public education, power to the State 
Emergency Management Agency to resolve disputes of cross-jurisdictional 
emergency planning, required public disclosure of plans, use of best technology 
available, required cooperation by institutions with local authorities, required 
reporting of planning efforts to the governor, and funding of $25 million for the City 
towards evacuation planning. 
 Regarding the public disclosure of plans, obvious conflicts arise when 
planning for an evacuation during a terrorist attack; an attack, which could utilize a 
publicly available evacuation plan to strategize its terror.  A suggestion to remedy this 
would be to create two distinct planning efforts: one for natural disasters (open to the 
public) and one for man-made disasters (kept confidential).   
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 In San Francisco, two plans exist that deal with evacuation.  The Association 
of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) has developed the Tsunami Evacuation Plan and 
the City and County of San Francisco Department of Emergency Management (DEM) 
has an evacuation plan that exists as part of the larger 2008 Emergency Management 
Program (EMP).  ABAG and the DEM hold both of these evacuation plans in 
confidentiality. 
 San Francisco’s emergency planning strength is its community participation.  
The community has more involvement in emergency planning efforts in San 
Francisco than any other of the case study cities.  There is a broad list of stakeholders 
invited to participate in emergency planning; there are CERT teams; and there are 
community response hubs, which are unique to San Francisco and will be discussed in 
more detail in the ‘community level’ section of this case study.       
 
Case Study: San Francisco 
State Level Plans: California 
 The draft of the most recent version of the California State Emergency Plan 
was written by the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services.  The plan follows the 
essential structure of all of the state’s emergency planning.  In California, all 
emergency planning follows the state’s Standardized Emergency Management 
System.  The State Emergency Plan follows this format and consequently has the 
command structure, roles, responsibilities and risks outlined much like the other 
state’s plans reviewed in this research.   
  
Metropolitan Planning Organization Plans: San Francisco 
 The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) is a council of 
governments and the ‘official comprehensive planning agency’ for the area which 
includes nine counties: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San 
Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma.  ABAG works on a variety of regional 
planning issues from estuary protection, to smart growth, to census projections.  One 
such regional planning effort is focused on tsunami preparedness and evacuation 
planning. 
 A potential tsunami is most likely to affect only low-lying costal areas.  The 
areas most likely to be impacted have been mapped and included in the tsunami 
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evacuation planning efforts.  Figure 10 demonstrates the shaded coastal areas, which 
have the potential of being impacted by a tsunami.   
 ABAG reports being involved in the creation of a document entitled Designing 
for Tsunamis by the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program.  This document 
promotes several key principles such as understanding risk and mitigation in building 
placement and design.  The last principle discussed in the document deals with 
evacuation. 
 Tsunami evacuations can take two forms: horizontal or vertical.  Horizontal 
evacuation means that people move inland to higher ground.  Vertical evacuation 
means that people move to the highest floors of tsunami evacuation approved 
buildings, which means that building inventories and agreements would be developed 
as part of the planning process according to this document. 
 
          Figure 11: Tsunami Evacuation Sign 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Source: NTHMP 2001 
  
 
 
 
 
 
City / County Level Plans: San Francisco 
 The City and County of San Francisco Department of Emergency 
Management (DEM) recently replaced the 2005 Citywide Emergency Operations Plan 
with the updated and expanded 2008 Emergency Management Program (EMP).  The 
EMP was created in compliance with the National Incident Management System, the 
California Standardized Emergency Management System, the Incident Command 
Figure 10: Portion of Tsunami 
Evacuation Map Evacuation Area 
Source: ABAG 2008 
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System, and the California State Emergency Plan.  The EMP is a high-level 
generalized framework for the City/County of San Francisco’s agencies to collaborate 
in emergency management.  The framework is overlain by the Emergency Support 
Function (ESF) system of the National Response Framework (NRF).  More detailed 
action plans or ‘functional responses annexes’ are annexes to the EMP, and in the case 
of the ‘evacuation plan’, the annex is confidential. 
 The EMP places the ultimate management responsibility with the Mayor and 
the Policy Group as seen in Figure 12 below.  The Policy Group is composed of San 
Francisco City/County officials that convene in the case of an emergency to advise the 
Mayor and relay policies to the Emergency Operations Center.  Among other things, 
the Policy Group would authorize an evacuation order. 
Figure 12: CCSF Emergency Chain of Command 
 
Source: EMP 2008 
 The EMP designates a Joint Information Center (JIC) as the physical location 
where the Public Information Officers gather and disseminate information regarding 
the emergency event.  One of the responsibilities outlined in the EMP of the JIC 
manager is to consider special needs and non-English speaking populations when 
disseminating information.       
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 The EMP places the EOC general staff under the EOC manager in four 
functional sections:  planning, operations support, logistics, finance and 
administration (see Figure 12).  The operations support section coordinates all the 
response operations.  The EMP organizes those emergency response operations in 
seven branches: fire and rescue, law enforcement, human services, infrastructure, 
transportation, community and communications.  The branches with the most direct 
connection to carless and special needs evacuation planning are fire and rescue,  
human services, transportation, and community branches. 
 The fire and rescue branch is responsible for coordinating fire, hazardous 
material and search and rescue operations in the City/County of San Francisco.  This 
branch, as defined by the EMP, fulfills three ESF’s as defined by the NRF:  ESF #4: 
Firefighting, ESF # 9 Urban Search and Rescue, and ESF #10 Oil and Hazardous 
Materials Response.  In addition to these roles as defined by the National Response 
Framework (NRF), the Fire and Rescue Branch go further by assisting the 
Neighborhood Emergency Response Teams (NERT) and coordinate the mutual aid 
system. 
 The Human Service Branch’s mission is to coordinate mass care, housing, 
human services, public health, medical services, agriculture and natural resource 
departments.  These roles fulfill four Emergency Support Functions (ESF) under the 
NRF:  ESF 6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services, ESF 8: Public Health and 
Medical Services, ESF 11: Animal Response, and ESF 17 Mass Fatality.   
  The Transportation Branch’s mission is to coordinate between the 
City/County of San Francisco’s transportation agencies during an emergency.  They 
are responsible for assisting evacuees who cannot evacuate themselves.  Additionally, 
they are responsible for evacuation assistance for patients under ESF 8: Public Health 
and Medical Services, and detainees, under ESF 13: Law Enforcement   
 The Community Branch works as a liaison between the EOC and community 
entities such as the Neighborhood Disaster Response Hubs, NGOs and the private 
sector.  In the City/County of San Francisco, community involvement takes a large 
role in disaster planning.  The Neighborhood Disaster Response Hubs and 
Neighborhood Emergency Response Teams (NERT) are proactive programs that 
recognize the contribution that local citizens can make as the initial responders to an 
emergency, because they commonly are the initial responders. 
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 In a very general sense, an evacuation would involve the use of bus transit 
resources and paratransit vehicles to move carless and special needs persons from 
staging areas to shelters.  Additionally, it would include the efforts necessary to move 
people back into the city (Stengel 2008).  Because of their confidentiality, details that 
are more specific are not available.  However, less specific details regarding such 
things as the DEM’s emergency command structure are made available to the public. 
 The City/County of San Francisco has an evacuee identification system or 
database.  More development would need to be done to upgrade the system to help 
reunite families separated during a disaster.  Family members could be scattered 
throughout the city at the onset of a sudden earthquake and such a system to help 
reunite families would be crucial (Stengel 2008).    
 In San Francisco County, hospitals and nursing homes are required to submit 
evacuation plans as part of their accreditation.  Part of this process includes 
collaboration with a ‘like facility’ to reduce the number of evacuees with medical 
needs in shelters and reduce overbooking of transportation contractors.  This 
relationship is crucial when facilities can share evacuation resources, or in the case of 
an evacuation of only a portion of the city, patients can be evacuated from one facility 
to another, and public shelters become the last resort.  This reduces stress on the 
public shelters (Stengel 2008). 
 
The Community Level: San Francisco 
 Neighborhood Disaster Response Hubs bring together organizations and 
resources that are already in place in a neighborhood.  It is neighbor helping neighbor.  
There are community resource mapping activities being developed to locate possible 
ADA compliant shelters, possible food suppliers, possible medical resources, and 
more, all of which would be brought together at the Neighborhood Disaster Response 
Hub.  It would also serve as a mechanism for communication with the EOC. 
 The Neighborhood Emergency Response Teams consist of citizens who are 
trained in emergency response skills such as search and rescue, and first aid.  They 
also perform a unique role by assisting persons who have registered with the Disaster 
Registry for Senior and Persons with Disabilities.  Various social service agencies 
encourage their patrons to register themselves on the Disaster Registry, which is 
managed by the Department of Public Health and kept in confidentiality at each of the 
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Fire Department’s Battalion District locations.  At the onset of an emergency, the seal 
is broken and the registry list is used by NERT members and first responders to check 
on registered persons and respond to their needs.  The confidentiality of the list until 
an emergency would seem to offer little time to prepare an appropriate emergency 
response, which is why the disaster registry is used as a resource-planning tool.  
Although kept in confidentiality, the list is used to generate shaded ‘density maps’ 
which show the amount of special needs in each Battalion District, without divulging 
specific locations.  These maps are used for resource planning, particularly the staging 
of paratransit vehicles (Stengel 2008).       
 The City/County of San Francisco also coordinates with the San Francisco 
Citizen Corps Council and San Francisco Collaborating Agencies Responding to 
Disaster (CARD).  The Citizen Corps Council functions much like the NERT 
program, but the Citizen Corps Council trains citizens, while the NERT members are 
trained by the San Francisco Fire Department.  The CARD collaborates with social 
service entities that serve vulnerable populations to ensure that those entities can 
continue to provide services to their clients after a disaster.  Additionally, CARD 
coordinates shared resources between their collaborating partners such as the 
American Red Cross, Salvation Army, Helplink, SF Lighthouse for the Blind, 
Volunteer Center, SF Senior Center, Food Bank, Independent Living Resource 
Center, Project Open Hand, Episcopal Community Services, St. Anthony Foundation, 
the SF Interfaith Council and others.  
 
Discussion of Planning Efforts 
 The emergency management planning in San Francisco, as with all case study 
cities, is focused on probable risk.  In San Francisco, the prominent risk is 
earthquakes, which come suddenly, offering no opportunity for a preemptive 
evacuation.  Therefore, the City’s community response hub concept is particularly 
useful and applicable during an earthquake response.  The community involvement 
concepts developed in San Francisco are important lessons for all emergency 
planners.  Citizens can be viewed as resources with much to offer.        
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By Robert Peterson 
Upon the conclusion of this research, a tabletop session was held by 
emergency evacuation planners in Baton Rouge, Louisiana that included invaluable 
discussion about the logistics of the evacuation due to Hurricane Gustav in 2008.  The 
following is a summary of the more important issues raised during the tabletop. 
 The tabletop exercise was held on January 15
Appendix 
th, 2009 at the offices of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in Baton Rouge.  It was organized 
by members of the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness (GOHSEP), Transportation Management Services (TMS), FEMA and 
the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD).    
Additional participants in the tabletop exercise included representatives from: 
 - Amtrak 
 - State Police 
 - Department of Education 
 - Plaquemines Parish 
 - Jefferson Parish 
 - Orleans Parish 
 - St. Bernard Parish 
 - Department of Health and Human Services 
 - Department of Social Services 
 - National Guard 
 - The Louis Armstrong International Airport (MSY) 
 - American Red Cross 
 - Department of Agriculture 
 
 The tabletop exercise was organized around a simulated event, Hurricane Sam.  
The discussion followed the stages of preparedness according to the number of hours 
before landfall of the hypothetical storm, beginning at H-72 or 72 hours before 
landfall.  Each participating agency was given the opportunity to state their role at 
each stage of preparedness.  Naturally, the conversation focused heavily on the prior 
evacuation from Hurricane Gustav just a few months prior. 
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 In the early stages of preparedness, the ‘leaning forward’ of resources was 
discussed.  This term refers to the nature of the preparation of resources before the 
first step is taken; just as when a person leans forward, a step is inevitable.  Due to the 
erratic nature of hurricanes, that first step may or may not be necessary; but the 
resources have to be in place regardless.   
 One of the most crucial resources is buses.  As stated earlier in this report, 
only 150 of the planned 700 coach buses were initially available during the Gustav 
evacuation.  The utilization of school buses is not as straight forward as one might 
like.  First, if the evacuation begins during a school week, the Governor must issue the 
school closure, which allows the school district to bus the children home, 
consequently freeing up this resource.  Second, the buses need drivers.   
During the Gustav evacuation, many civilian school bus drivers drove 
evacuees to shelters.  Many drivers then proceeded to hotels, which were billed to the 
DOTD.  Unfortunately, there was not much clarity about this policy, or about policies 
regarding the drivers’ families.  During the tabletop, additional anecdotal evidence 
was suggested that drivers often felt uncomfortable, even threatened by evacuees who 
were often belligerent and/or intoxicated.  Consequently, many civilian drivers have 
expressed a reluctance to participate in this capacity during future evacuations.  
The National Guard also provided guardspersons as drivers, thus filling a 
resource gap.  The National Guard representative at the tabletop mentioned that the 
guardspersons only received a short training before being entrusted with the bus full 
of evacuees.  The tabletop discussion did not reach a conclusion on this matter. 
Third, the provision of buses for evacuation is, at least in Louisiana, the 
decision of the school district which controls this resource and, possibly, the private 
contractor which provides the service to the school district.  Orleans Parish 
representatives mentioned that they were “getting the run around” from First Student, 
the recovery school district’s bussing contract holder.  First Student was reluctant to 
allow Orleans Parish to utilize its buses for evacuation.  This reluctance is due, at least 
in part, to the issues surrounding liability. 
Fourth, the responsibility for any damages to the school buses needs 
clarification in order to facilitate the involvement of this resource in the evacuation 
effort.  It was reported in the tabletop, that school districts were sending bills for 
damages to school buses directly to the DOTD.  The school districts were not 
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involving their insurance companies out of fear that their premiums would increase.  
Again, a resolution of this issue was not reached during the tabletop. 
Additional resources found to be lacking during the Gustav evacuation were 
ambulances and paratransit vehicles.  The DOTD reported that the paratransit vehicles 
will no longer be “sent out as they come in” as they were during Gustav.  It was a 
poor utilization of the resource.  In the future, these paratransit vehicles will be 
designated to respond to situations that allow them to take full advantage of their 
ADA compliance.  Ambulances, on the other hand, were more problematic.  It was 
reported that 600 ambulances were needed during Gustav, but only 300 were 
available.  Furthermore, those ambulances that were driven in from out-of-state by 
their paramedic crews were expected to immediately begin home pickups upon arrival 
to the city, but the crews needed rest.  To resolve this issue, it was suggested that crew 
rest times be calculated into the plans, and that the ambulances be called in earlier, 
possibly, before the course and strength of the hurricane have been adequately 
established.  It was noted that many persons needing medical assistance resorted to 
utilizing whatever means possible to evacuate by calling on friends or family because 
they grew tired and anxious from waiting for the ambulance pickup.  Orleans Parish 
representatives stated that if these alternative informal resources were adequate to 
protect and maintain the health of those persons needing medical assistance, then 
those evacuees should have chosen that alternative initially and not relied upon the 
City Assisted Evacuation Plan (CAEP), which is intended to be a last resort.  
A specific case of poor allocation of ambulance resources was thoroughly 
discussed during the tabletop.  Apparently, ten ambulances were staged at Zephyr 
Field in Jefferson Parish for a hospital evacuation effort involving DOTD contracted 
airplanes.  The arrival time of the planes was said to be within two hours from the 
time that the Department of Social Services (DSS) questioned the DOTD.  
Unfortunately, the planes were delayed two days and that information was never 
relayed to DSS.  The result was a hurried hospital evacuation effort.  Furthermore, 
these ten ambulances were left there waiting for two days, when they could have been 
utilized by the Jefferson Parish evacuation efforts.  These ten ambulances were highly 
visible by the Jefferson Parish emergency responders and desperate evacuees who 
were battling with a shortage of ambulances.  Therefore, heavy criticism fell 
unnecessarily upon the Jefferson Parish emergency responders. 
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DSS discussed the problems they experienced with the registration of 
evacuees.  They had positive results testing out their capacity with a few hundred 
volunteers on previous occasions; however, Gustav’s 18,000 evacuees placed a severe 
strain on the system.  They recognized a need for more processing stations and better 
training with the ‘Phoenix’ software, which was used to track evacuees.  Additionally, 
it was mentioned that this portion of the process could be contracted out to 
professionals who might be more familiar with the program.  Furthermore, DSS and 
DOTD detailed their efforts to make shelter destination locations of each bus well 
known before departure so that information can be shared between families and 
friends.  To further the efficiency of the logistics, the DOTD is developing an online 
bus tracking board that will serve similarly to an arrival and departure board at an 
airport.   
Transportation triage was also revealed as a weakness during the tabletop.  
Transportation triage refers to the portion of the evacuee registration process that 
ultimately decides which form of evacuation is appropriate given an evacuee’s health 
condition.  The options are essentially plane, train or bus.  It was discussed that many 
evacuees are ‘transportation-sensitive’ (a term apparently coined by a representative 
from Plaquemines Parish to refer to those persons who have health conditions 
exacerbated by lengthy bus rides).  At the root of this problem is the need to increase 
the sheltering capacity closer to the affected areas, an issue being addressed by the 
American Red Cross.  It was also suggested that evacuees bound to their homes by 
medical conditions be somehow included in the hospital evacuation plans.  This 
suggestion was based on the notion that many of these persons’ homes are essentially 
hospitals.  Consequently the special needs shelters are essentially converting buildings 
into hospitals that are not appropriately configured.   
The afternoon discussion of the tabletop focused on the repopulation efforts.  
All agencies involved conceded that it was not as easy as reversing the evacuation 
plan.  The repopulation begins when the mayor reopens the city to the public.  His 
authority on this matter was not questioned, however the information that the mayor 
uses to make that decision was discussed, particularly the information about the post-
hurricane situations in surrounding parishes.  The geography of the region is such that 
returning Orleans Parish residents would pass through St. Tammany or Jefferson 
Parish to return home. Therefore, for Orleans to open its doors, Jefferson Parish must 
also open to returning residents.  The same applies to St. Bernard and Plaquemines 
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Parishes.  To address this information sharing, the Governor’s Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Preparedness offered a color-coded system for the parish 
recovery levels.  It addresses necessities like drinking water, electricity, hospitals, 
debris, etc. and ranks the parish accordingly.  It was presented as a tool which the 
mayors could use to better understand the recovery level of their neighbors and make 
repopulation decisions accordingly. 
The tabletop ended with a summary of the main points that need to be 
addressed further and commitments to regroup and focus more specifically upon these 
concerns. 
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